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Johanson vs. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 58 (Dec. 27, 2007)1 
 




 Petitioner requested writ of mandamus to vacate a district court order sealing divorce 




 The Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to 
vacate its order sealing divorce proceedings and issuing a gag order. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Petitioner Jane Elizabeth Johanson and Robert W. Lueck obtained a divorce, in 
December 1999.  Lueck, a district court judge at the time, was ordered to pay monthly child 
support pursuant to the divorce decree.  Lueck was not reelected to his seat as a district court 
judge in November 2004 and accordingly filed a motion to reduce monthly child support 
payments.  The district court entered an order reducing the amount of child support arrears, as 
well as the amount of future payments.  The order did not provide that the record was to be 
sealed. 
 Lueck filed a motion to correct a clerical error, arguing that the order was inaccurate as to 
reducing child support arrears.  Lueck argued that he did not want the arrears order to be used 
against him during his campaign, as he was again running for a district court judgeship.  The 
district court entered an order sealing the case and also issued a gag order sua sponte preventing 
the parties and counsel from disclosing any information or discussing any portion of the case 
with any other party. 
 Johanson petitioned the Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition to direct the district 
court to vacate its order sealing the entire case and issuing a gag order.  Alternatively, Johanson 
petitioned the Court for a writ to direct the district court to amend its order in compliance with 




 A petition for a writ of mandamus requests the court to compel an official to perform a 
legally required duty or to control a manifest abuse of discretion.2  A petition for a writ of 
prohibition requests the court to arrest district court proceedings when the proceedings exceed 
the district court’s jurisdiction.3  As writs for mandamus and prohibition are “extraordinary 
remedies,” the Court has sole discretion in determining whether or not to entertain such 
                                                 
1 By Jamie Zimmerman. 
2 See DR Partners v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 116 Nev. 616, 620, 6 P.3d 465, 468 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
34.160 (2005). 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.320 (2005). 
petitions.4  The Court generally entertains petitions for writs of mandamus or prohibition “only 
when no ‘plain, speedy and adequate remedy [exists] in the ordinary course of law.’”5  Here, the 
Court concluded that although an appeal often constitutes a speedy and adequate legal remedy, 
no such adequate legal remedy is available in this matter and therefore the Court elected to 
entertain the petition.6 
 The issue before the Court was whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering 
the entire case file sealed, without making any findings pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes § 
125.110, and in issuing a gag order prohibiting all communication regarding the case.  
 
Sealing Divorce Records 
 
 Under Nevada law, all pleadings, orders of the court, and judgments shall remain open to 
the public in divorce proceedings.7  Finding that Nevada law clearly provides that certain 
documents “shall” remain open to the public, the Court concluded that the district court did not 
possess the discretion to seal the divorce pleadings in the instant case.  As such, the Court found 
that the district court abused its discretion in sealing the entire divorce case file. 
 Lueck argued that the district court possesses the discretion to seal divorce papers under 
Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, wherein the court noted “the obvious and 
equally well-established principle . . . that courts do have the inherent power to close their 
proceedings and records when justified by the circumstances.”8  Although the Whitehead Court 
noted exceptions under which civil cases may be sealed9, the Court concluded that Whitehead is 
not controlling in divorce proceedings, as Nevada Revised Statutes § 125.110 expressly provides 
that divorce proceedings “shall” remain open to the public. 
 
Issuance of Gag Order 
 
 With respect to the district court’s issuance of the gag order, the Court discussed whether 
the district court’s gag order was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, as to amount to a 
violation of free speech.  Gag orders which operate to prevent parties from making extra-judicial 
statements regarding their own case constitutes a prior restraint on speech, and as such violates 
the First Amendment right to free speech.10   
                                                 
4 Smith v. District Court, 107 Nev. 674, 818 P.2d 849 (1991). 
5 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 34.170, 34.330 (2005). 
6 The Court reviewed the district court’s order de novo.  
7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.110(1)(b) (2005).  The Court noted that only the summons, complaint, judgment, and 
affidavit and order shall remain public in divorce proceedings in which the complaint is unanswered by the 
defendant.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.110.  As to all other divorce proceedings in which the complaint is answered by 
the defendant, the Court noted that all other papers may be sealed upon written request of either party.  NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 125.110(2). 
8 111 Nev. 70, 121, 893 P.2d 866, 897 (1995), superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in Mosley v. 
Comm’n on Judicial Discipline, 117 Nev. 371, 374 n.1, 22 P.3d 655, 657 n.1 (2001). 
9 In Whitehead, the Court noted that case files should only be sealed in the following circumstances:  ensure 
compliance with public policy, protect trade secrets, protect a compelling governmental interest, obtain evidence to 
determine legal issues in a case, protect innocent third parties from injury, or to protect privacy interests of the 
parties when disclosure will amount to a substantial injury.  111 Nev. at 120-21, 893 P.2d at 897 (quoting Barron v. 
Florida Freedom Newspapers, 531 So. 2d 113, 118 (Fla. 1988). 
10 U.S. v. SCARFO, 263 F.3d 80, 92 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 The Court adopted the following standard, which provides that a district court may only 
issue a gag order in the following circumstances:  “(1) the activity restrained poses either a clear 
or present danger or a serious and imminent threat to a protected competing interest, (2) the order 
is narrowly drawn, and (3) less restrictive alternatives are not available.”11 
 Although the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit has held that publicity may constitute a 
serious and imminent threat, 12 the district court failed to consider whether publicity may 
constitute a serious and imminent threat in this case.   
 A narrowly drawn gag order is one which provides “clear guidance” as to the types of 
speech prohibited by the order.13  As the present order prohibited the parties and counsel from 
discussing the case or disclosing any information to any other party, the Court concluded that the 
order was overbroad. 
 With regard to the availability of less restrictive alternatives, the Court concluded that the 
district court did not satisfy this prong of the test because it failed to explore any less restrictive 
alternative prior to issuing the gag order sua sponte. 
 As the district court’s gag order failed to satisfy the aforementioned test, the Court 




  The Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in sealing the entire case 
file, as such files are required to remain open pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes § 125.110.  
The Court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the gag order, as 
the gag order was not necessary to protect a serious and imminent threat, was overbroad, and the 
district court failed to examine any less restrictive alternatives.  As such, the Court instructed the 
clerk of the court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order 




                                                 
11 The Court adopted the standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit, in Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court for C. Dist. of Cal., 
764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985). 
12 Id. at 598. 
13 Id. at 599. 
14 The Court also noted that the district court violated Johanson’s procedural due process rights by failing to provide 
her with reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before it issued the gag order sua sponte. 
